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Introduction
SIGAL R. BEN PORATH AND ROGERS M. SMITH
Many, perhaps most, adults today who  were born and educated in ad-vanced industrial societies grew up with a picture of the world that 
seemed commonsensical and oft en comforting. For them, the world’s terri-
tory was divided up among sovereign states, each with its own unique, gen-
erally stable body of citizens who received protection from their state and 
owed it exclusive allegiance. Th ose states  were expected to recognize and 
respect each other’s sovereignty in ways conducive to peaceful coexistence. 
While struggles over borders and sovereignty fl ared up even under these con-
ditions, wars  were mostly seen as aberrations to the generally stable state of 
aff airs. One state, one territory, one citizenry with one allegiance— that was 
the way the world mostly was and should be.
Much post– World War II scholarship in many disciplines endorsed these 
views. To cite one infl uential instance: in 1948, Leo Gross, a scholar born in 
Austria- Hungary who became a prominent international law authority at 
Tuft s University, argued that the 1648 “Peace of Westphalia” had initiated 
a centuries- long struggle to “establish something resembling world unity on 
the basis of states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territo-
ries and subordinated to no earthly authority.” Gross contended that the 
Westphalian hope was, as the Spanish legal scholastic Francisco Suárez had 
argued, for each sovereign state to “constitute a perfect community in itself, 
consisting of its own members,” while still recognizing itself as a member of 
the “universal society” of the human race. A world so ordered might through 
peaceful coexistence promote the fl ourishing of all humanity— a hope that 
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/19/17 6:53 PM
Gross used to persuade those of his time to invest substantially in the new 
United Nations.
Yet though the world may have come closer to that system of peacefully 
coexisting, fully sovereign nation- states in the quarter- century following 
the end of World War II than in most of human history, in retrospect it was 
clear that the peace was then still only a partial achievement. Wars between 
states never ceased nor did transnational violence conducted by nonstate 
actors. Even the passport, the great modern symbol of national membership 
in and global protection by a sovereign nation- state, came into near- universal 
use only in the late nineteenth and especially the early twentieth century. 
And today, although in percentage terms the numbers remain small, increas-
ing numbers of persons, rich and poor, either are entitled to hold more than 
one national passport or are living in the territories of states that do not pro-
vide them with passports. Some hold other forms of authorization to reside 
in those territories, but some lack any legal documentation at all.
And many who hold legal membership in the state in which they reside, 
like the Hmong and the Iraqis who aided foreign armies and the highly edu-
cated South Asians employed by foreign fi rms, nonetheless act primarily as 
allegiants of, or at least collaborators with, foreign governments that are us-
ing force against their state, or multinational corporations that are pursuing 
global economic, not local objectives. In the twenty- fi rst century, it seems 
clear that while the nation- state still is a highly signifi cant po liti cal entity, 
capable of exercising military power, securing its borders, enacting economic 
policies, and conferring memberships at will, its place and role are chang-
ing. Many forces are pushing prevailing forms of po liti cal community away 
from that world of singular allegiance to sovereign, in de pen dent nation- states 
and toward new confi gurations. Th ese may take the form of a panoramic 
sprawl of multiple, interlaced, subnational, decentralized, federated, and su-
pranational sovereign or semisovereign po liti cal communities; plural citi-
zenships; and an even more varied range of new economic, military, cultural, 
social, and virtual transnational associations. Some scholars and activists 
depict those as incipient forms of alternative and transnational, even global 
citizenship, or cosmopolitanism.
In contrast to the idealized picture of a world of stable, in de pen dent sov-
ereign states, largely peacefully coexisting, this world can seem one of new 
possibilities, teeming with promises and dangers. To simplify a bit, modern 
scholarship can be seen as having gone through two waves of response to 
these developments. In the 1990s, books and articles began to appear, espe-
cially by Eu ro pe an scholars, proclaiming that the era of nation- state citizen-
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ship was almost over, succumbing to the rise of new forms of eff ectively 
transnational membership. Yasemin Soysal may have put the case most 
sharply in her 1995 book, Th e Limits of Citizenship, which opened by declar-
ing that a “new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in 
the post- war era, one whose or ga niz ing and legitimating principles are based 
on universal personhood rather than national belonging.”  Many scholars 
of the 1990s, especially David Held and Daniele Archibugi, argued force-
fully and enthusiastically that these developments meant that the world 
had at least the potential to move to desirable forms of “cosmopolitan de-
mocracy” in which national memberships would play greatly lessened 
roles in federated global demo cratic systems. Others, like legal scholar 
Peter H. Schuck, a contributor to the present volume, expressed far more 
concern about the “devaluation” of national citizenships, including Ameri-
can citizenship, but Schuck still agreed initially that trends appeared to be 
moving in that direction.
Soon, however, these perceptions and the anticipation of the demise of 
national citizenship met with major scholarly challenges, both empirical 
and normative. Th e challenges simultaneously refl ected and analyzed anxi-
eties over immigrants that have mounted in modern Eu rope, the United 
States, and other immigrant- receiving nations. Schuck, among others, 
proclaimed a “re- evaluation of American citizenship” as domestic po liti-
cal groups reasserted the distinctive rights and responsibilities of that status 
and resisted the rise of “post- national citizenship” in ways he found partly 
concerning but partly commendable. With more evident worries, Linda Bos-
niak argued infl uentially that although modern liberal demo cratic states of-
ten sought to be “soft ,” egalitarian and inclusive toward those they recognized 
as their members, in many cases they  were increasingly seeking to be “hard” 
and exclusionary toward nonmembers, thus reaffi  rming their po liti cal power. 
Elizabeth Cohen has concluded that because modern states “require citizen-
ship” (require populations that accept those states’ distinctive authority to at 
least some minimal extent) and populations require the governing institu-
tions that states provide, we remain as an empirical matter far from the end of 
state- based national citizenships, even if their empirical realities are more 
complex and shift ing than they once seemed to be. Events like the “Arab 
Spring” of 2011 seem to confi rm ongoing commitments among citizens in 
diff erent countries to the preservation of the nation- state, even as they try to 
struggle against repressive state governments.
On the normative side, many continue to argue for the desirability of 
national citizenship, as David Miller and Jeremy Rabkin have in their past 
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/19/17 6:53 PM
writings and continue to do in this volume. Moreover, many scholars of 
economic and cultural globalization who are critical of nationalism have 
nonetheless expressed at least equal concern about many of the new forms 
of transnational or “cosmopolitan” migration and memberships on the 
grounds that they are proving anything but demo cratic and egalitarian. 
Because transnational memberships are oft en held by those highly placed in 
multinational corporations that are pursuing their economic interests in 
many locales, abetted by ser vice industries staff ed by cheap migrant or local 
labor, many forms of modern “plural” and “postnational” citizenship are 
seen as reinforcing patterns of economic in e qual ity and cultural domina-
tion. As Aihwa Ong has put it, “mobile managers, technocrats, and profes-
sionals” oft en seek both to “circumvent and benefi t from diff erent national 
regimes by selecting diff erent sites for investments, work, and family relo-
cation” as part of their “trans- Pacifi c business commute.” In addition, 
supranational entities oft en have not fostered practices of governance in 
their internal or ga ni za tion and in their relationships with various territo-
rial populations that satisfy demo cratic demands more eff ectively than the 
nation- state.
In light of these developments, during the 2009– 2010 academic year, the 
Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism asked a 
wide range of scholars in diff erent disciplines to refl ect on these apparent 
empirical transformations of the world, away from the absolute sovereignty 
of in de pen dent nation- states and toward the proliferation of varieties of 
plural citizenship, perhaps the emergence of possible new forms of global 
allegiance, and to consider the normative implications of these emergent 
forms of membership and sovereignty. Th e results of these scholars’ work in 
many ways both defi ed and exceeded expectations. Th ey are contained in 
this volume.
Th e essays collected  here display widespread ac cep tance that we cannot 
grasp the empirical realities or the important normative issues today by fo-
cusing only on sovereign states and their actions, interests, and aspirations. 
All the chapter authors accept that a great variety of globalizing forces are 
realities that we need to take into account— but they draw very diff erent 
conclusions concerning those realities. We have structured their contribu-
tions so that readers can assess the character of recent developments and the 
substance of the many debates in regard to what may well be the three most 
crucial issues concerning transformations in the sovereignty of modern 
nation- states: the changing role of military force within this new landscape 
of sovereignty; eff orts to control and channel immigration across state 
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boundaries; and the development and assessment of forms of cosmopolitan 
alternatives to nation- states.
If, as the Progressive- era journalist Randolph Bourne provocatively 
 argued, “war is the health of the state” because states oft en build strength 
and support in order to fi ght wars, then questions about the role that wars 
and warfare play in an era of apparently declining national sovereignty are 
crucial to assessing the extent and signifi cance of that decline. Issues of im-
migration are just as fundamental since they implicate foundational concep-
tions of who belongs to a par tic u lar po liti cal community and who does not, 
and since immigration policy debates are now provoking major controver-
sies in many immigrant- receiving and some immigrant- sending states. Th e 
concerns for current forms of po liti cal affi  liation, sovereignty, and allegiance 
borne of war and migration indicate where we are now in terms of global po-
liti cal structures; but they also prompt consideration of alternatives to the 
model of a world of sovereign nation- states and the benefi ts and burdens 
those alternatives may provide.
In Part I, “War, Sovereignty, and Plural Citizenships,” international- 
relations scholar Arjun Chowdhury provides an overview of the current 
condition of the sovereign- state system that challenges much conventional 
wisdom. In “Sovereignty Out of Joint,” Chowdhury disputes those who think 
that sovereign states are losing capacities they once had to foster interna-
tional order, and he goes on to disagree both with those who conclude that 
we must get past relying on nation- states and those who think we must in-
stead strengthen them. Chowdhury argues that the European- based system 
of contending imperial states never provided real international stability, nor 
have states been able to do so since the end of the imperial age. Much of the 
order that the modern era has achieved resulted from the dangers of nuclear 
weapons, Chowdhury claims, while postcolonial states have oft en been em-
broiled in civil wars and interstate confl icts that have kept a fully orderly 
world elusive. Th ough Chowdhury does not off er a formula for how global 
politics should be structured in the future, his analysis casts doubt on whether 
seeking to achieve a world that consists only of “strong” sovereign states is 
wise. Instead, state- building eff orts, particularly when conducted by foreign 
governments, may only help keep wars endemic.
If this argument is true, then what are the consequences? In “War, 
Rights, and Contention: Lasswell v. Tilly,” sociologist and po liti cal scientist 
Sidney Tarrow explores this question by assessing evidence and arguments 
for the contrasting claims of Charles Tilly, who maintained that early mod-
ern Eu ro pe an states had to extend more expansive rights to many of their 
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citizens in order to win support for their military eff orts, and Harold Lass-
well, who insisted that modern “garrison states” oft en denied rights to many 
citizens in an eff ort to achieve military effi  ciency and secure power. Using 
T. H. Marshall’s famed framework of civil, po liti cal, and social rights, Tarrow 
concludes that there is some evidence for each of these rival claims, particu-
larly in the long run. While wars are being waged, Lasswell’s worries about 
denials especially of civil rights and civil liberties are well justifi ed, while 
the expansion of social rights during and aft er wars seems to support Tilly’s 
approach. In an era when concerns about the twenty- fi rst century’s most 
notorious nonstate international actors— radical Islamic terrorists— are lead-
ing many governments to conceive of themselves as in a state of perpetual 
war, this conclusion provides less than optimistic commentary on the direc-
tion in which relations between citizens and states may be headed, even in 
liberal demo cratic states.
In “Subcontracting Sovereignty: Th e Aft erlife of Proxy War,” anthro-
pologist Anna Tsing examines a further, less noted dimension of modern 
warfare. In the past half- century, the United States and other major powers 
have oft en engaged in “proxy wars.” Th ey have formed alliances with dissi-
dent groups in diff erent regions to help them conduct military operations 
seeking to overthrow their common enemies. Although America’s proxy war-
riors have oft en hoped to gain power themselves, they have oft en found 
themselves instead living as refugees in the United States, negotiating mul-
tiple citizenship claims. Tsing did fi eld work with Hmong refugees in Cali-
fornia who had fought against communists in Southeast Asia, hoping to build 
Hmong sovereignty. She provides compelling reports of how these dual citi-
zens maintain ways of life bound by memories of wars and commitments to 
continue to fi ght, on behalf of both the United States and themselves. Th at 
military ser vice includes combat by young Hmong men in Iraq. Th is ser-
vice, like other instances of proxy warfare, can be seen as fostering greater 
inclusiveness in and across modern nation- states, or it can be interpreted as 
reinforcing global in e qual ity, violence, and exploitation. In the Hmong case, 
it is clear that increased transnational interde pen den cy, and the embrace by 
both the United States and the Hmong of their plural citizenships, have not 
been part of the achievement of a more pacifi c and stable world order. In-
stead, plural citizenship and subcontracted sovereignty have facilitated the 
perpetuation of war.
Colonial historian and legal scholar Nasser Hussain’s essay, “In Confl ict: 
Sovereignty, Identity, Counterinsurgency,” fi nds another military legacy of 
the imperial state system playing a major role in the modern postcolonial 
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world. Th e heart of imperial counterinsurgency strategy was the identifi -
cation of some colonial residents as the “people” who  were to be protected 
and aided against “insurgents,” even though the populations in question  were 
profoundly interwoven. To “clear- hold- build,” as General David Petraeus’s 
renowned counterinsurgency manual urges, communities and groups must 
be labeled, oft en separated, and controlled. Th ose practices can be disturb-
ingly brutal in the course of counterinsurgency military operations; but Hus-
sain’s larger point is that they also may become routinized aspects of the 
forms of governance provided by the regimes that emerge aft er military 
clashes diminish. How far those governing Iraq will feel they can and should 
move to “total control of the population” through its compartmentalization 
into favored “citizens” and repressed “insurgents” is central to Iraq politics 
today and to other societies shaped by the modern principles and practices 
of counterinsurgency that carry on the contested legacies of Eu rope’s impe-
rial age.
If the refl ections in Part I on war and sovereignty yield few reasons for 
hope that the decline in the system of in de pen dent sovereign states is pro-
ducing an accompanying decline in militarism, the accounts of the authors 
included in Part II, “Immigration, Sovereignty, and Plural Citizenships,” 
paint a more varied landscape. In “Citizen Terrorists and the Challenges 
of Plural Citizenship,” Peter H. Schuck observes that the heightened recep-
tivity to dual citizenship and to immigrants that form part of the liberalism 
of modern American citizenship policies can leave the nation vulnerable to 
the terrorist assaults of citizens whose real allegiances are to virulently anti- 
American causes. Schuck notes that one obvious response, and for many 
Americans an emotionally satisfying response, would be the denaturaliza-
tion of foreign- born citizen terrorists, perhaps even of native- born ones. Yet 
Schuck recognizes that such a power might be wielded in illiberal ways, and 
he doubts that it would prove an eff ective deterrent since terrorists place 
only instrumental value on their American citizenship. He concludes then 
that the trend toward ac cep tance of plural citizenship probably will and 
should continue despite the accompanying risk for citizen terrorists, at least 
under current circumstances.
In “Immigration, Causality, and Complicity,” phi los o pher Michael Blake 
considers two more general arguments concerning the obligations of 
modern states to would- be immigrants. As Anna Tsing’s discussion of the 
Hmong illustrates, some might think a state is responsible for admitting at 
least some individuals aff ected by its destructive foreign wars. And when a 
state is complicit in encouraging and sustaining illegal immigration, many 
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may think it obliged to accord those immigrants legal status. In regard to 
the fi rst argument, Blake contends that it matters greatly whether the de-
structive war was also an unjust war. If it was not, then in his view no special 
obligations arise to accept those aff ected as fellow residents or citizens. Blake 
also sees some force in the argument that obligations can arise from com-
plicity, but not quite in the way many others do. He suggests that persuasive 
arguments for excluding immigrants oft en rest on the need to preserve a 
coherent, meaningful culture that they might make impossible to sustain. 
But if the existing culture in fact depends on the labor of undocumented 
immigrants, it cannot coherently deny them residence; so it should legalize 
their presence. On both counts, Blake is concerned to ensure that the mili-
tary and economic interconnections of modern states with outsiders are not 
turned too quickly into arguments for open borders that might endanger 
the survival of those states, at least in the forms valued by their members. 
Like Schuck, however, he nonetheless agrees that under currently preva-
lent circumstances, arguments for inclusiveness have great force.
Legal theorist Ayelet Shachar off ers more unequivocal reasons for inclu-
sion of undocumented immigrants. In “Th e Missing Link: Rootedness as 
a Basis for Membership,” she elaborates on the implications of her earlier 
arguments for giving full legal recognition to a principle she terms jus nexi. 
Drawing on analogous conceptions of property, Shachar contends that claims 
to formal civic membership strengthen as persons become more deeply 
“rooted” in the social, economic, and po liti cal life of a par tic u lar commu-
nity. For children of undocumented aliens, whether born before or aft er their 
arrival in a new country, this “rootedness” is likely soon to become quite 
pervasive as they grow up, form social networks, and are schooled and even-
tually employed almost entirely within that society. Shachar’s principle does 
not demand citizenship at birth upon a nation’s soil although po liti cal 
communities might decide to adopt that policy for diff erent reasons. But 
it  does argue for extending citizenship to millions of long- term resident, 
undocumented immigrants— in the United States and other immigrant- 
receiving nations— who have in eff ect already become members of the econ-
omies and societies of those nations.
Shachar’s arguments therefore serve as a bridge to the concerns about 
the character and desirability of more expansive forms of po liti cal associa-
tion that occupy the authors in Part III, “On Cosmopolitan Alternatives.” In 
its opening essay, “World Government Is  Here!” phi los o pher Robert E. 
Goodin boldly proclaims that institutions of global governance have been 
developing over time, at what looks like an accelerating pace. Examples of 
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these institutions include U.N. peacekeeping forces; the World Intellectual 
Property Or ga ni za tion, which administers international patent agreements; 
and a variety of courts claiming international jurisdiction. Drawing pri-
marily on U.S. history, Goodin notes that large- scale governing institutions 
oft en gradually acquire greater authority, and though he does not seek in 
his essay to advocate for a single “world government,” he does contend that 
we are witnessing evolution in that direction without, so far, the dire conse-
quences that opponents of more cosmopolitan arrangements fear.
Po liti cal scientist and legal scholar Jeremy Rabkin disagrees sharply. In 
“If You Need a Friend, Don’t Call a Cosmopolitan,” Rabkin criticizes ef-
forts to create international laws and institutions devoted to cosmopolitan 
principles of equality and universalism for reasons that echo in some ways 
those of left - wing critics of cosmopolitanism. Rabkin is concerned that in 
many articulations, cosmopolitan principles are far too leveling, treating 
all kinds of po liti cal communities and combatants uniformly, when in-
stead great distinctions should be made. He particularly rejects what he sees 
as cosmopolitan demands that governments accord full and equal rights to 
states, groups, and individuals engaged in massive lawless violence. Such 
misplaced respect, he warns, may enable those who disdain all notions of hu-
man rights to prevail in combat over their international law- abiding oppo-
nents. Rabkin maintains that it is not only morally appropriate but morally 
imperative for governments and citizens to act to uphold the honor of their 
own nations by refraining from committing injustices and by refusing to 
suff er or accept them. Human experience shows, he insists, that a world of 
sovereign and honorable nation-states is more likely to be a peaceful and just 
world than one that seeks to realize any of the cosmopolitan alternatives 
envisioned so far.
In “Th e Physico- Material Bases of Cosmopolitanism,” literary scholar 
Pheng Cheah raises concerns about both the philosophy and practice of 
cosmopolitanism. Cheah, too, perceives in the philosophic sources of cos-
mopolitan politics from Kant through Marx to today a stress on universal 
human ends. Th is emphasis justifi es global eff orts to remake the world to 
actualize humanity’s potential for free, peaceful, and prosperous self- 
development. But like Foucault, Cheah sees these cosmopolitan goals as in 
reality justifying forms of global governmentality that manage populations 
far more than they empower them and that do so primarily for enhanced 
global economic productivity. He urges a “methodological cosmopolitan-
ism” that seeks to track the transnational pro cesses, structures, and prac-
tices that reduce people around the world into eco nom ical ly “useful” entities 
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as a precondition to any eff ort to consider what arrangements might help 
them become more fully human.
Anthropologist Elizabeth A. Povinelli highlights a still more unconven-
tional critical perspective on cosmopolitan alternatives in her essay, “Citi-
zens of the Earth: Indigenous Cosmopolitanism and the Governance of the 
Prior.” Like some of the other authors, Povinelli probes the Western philo-
sophic roots of cosmopolitan ideals, and she notes that they have long issued 
in a precept holding that eff orts to develop globe- spanning systems of gov-
ernance must recognize a duty to defer to communities who have prior claims 
to par tic u lar portions of the earth’s surface. But Povinelli calls attention to 
dangers that lurk in granting this priority to “the prior.” Th e long course of 
human history involves pervasive contestation at diff erent times in almost 
every locale; so it is hard for any group to establish fi rmly that it is truly 
“prior.” It is also likely that along the way, some claiming to speak for a par-
tic u lar group may have acted in ways that can be interpreted as forfeiting 
many of their claims to territorial governance. And she argues that in any 
case, contributors to the growing body of indigenous critical theory con-
ceive of the claims of today’s indigenous peoples in ways that vary sharply 
from the worldviews of most modern cosmopolitans. Indigenous claims are 
best seen as concerns to maintain ways of life that intertwine human and 
nonhuman, animate and inanimate, organic and nonorganic entities within 
distinctive but shared modes of being in the world. Th ese perspectives are 
in some respects more inclusive than the largely humanity- centered ones 
espoused by cosmopolitan theorists, for they incorporate concerns for ani-
mals, plants, and the earth itself. At the same time, the viewpoints articulated 
by critical indigenous theory argue strongly against activities that threaten 
to erase indigenous ways of life in quests to pursue what they see as oft en 
repressive, cosmopolitan visions.
Th e fi nal two chapters continue to raise doubts about the desirability of 
pursuing global citizenship or cosmopolitan po liti cal institutions. Each 
does so from a perspective that is respectful of many cosmopolitan ethical 
aspirations, but each nonetheless favors eff orts to maintain and extend the 
structure of the modern world as an array of distinct modern, liberal demo-
cratic states. Po liti cal theorist David Miller has long argued in favor of 
liberal forms of nationality. In “Th e Idea of Global Citizenship,” he adds an 
insistence that po liti cal citizenship involves engagement with others to 
settle disagreements on terms of reciprocity, with all citizens accountable to 
all their fellow citizens for the arguments and actions they contribute to col-
lective resolution of their disputes and to the pursuit of both their shared 
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and their distinct interests. Miller argues that po liti cal relationships of this 
valuable type are simply not feasible on a global scale. He views it as both 
possible and desirable to have ethical concern for all humanity and to act to 
avoid global harms as much as possible. But he does not think it wise to term 
such conduct forms “global citizenship,” for they do not involve the concrete 
engagements with fellow citizens on terms of reciprocity and accountability 
that local po liti cal citizenship can provide most vividly and that national citi-
zenship can off er, through suitable demo cratic institutions, for members of 
a par tic u lar national community. According to Miller, we can and should 
seek to be “globally concerned citizens,” but we should remain citizens of par-
tic u lar sovereign nation- states nonetheless.
In “Why Does the State Matter Morally? Po liti cal Obligation and Par-
ticularity,” po liti cal theorist Anna Stilz argues for a somewhat similar con-
clusion but on grounds that are more clearly and fi rmly cosmopolitan. Stilz 
believes that justice requires us to recognize the natural duties as well as 
natural rights of all human beings. She contends that in practice, rights and 
duties cannot be realized without the intermediation of state institutions 
that protect some and coerce others in appropriate ways. Th e indeterminacy 
of human reasoning, however, means that people disagree on what sorts of 
protection and coercion and what types of institutions are appropriate for 
these goals. As a result, it is far more likely that eff ective institutions will 
be constructed within par tic u lar states than on a global scale. Over time, 
moreover, members of a par tic u lar state develop a history of shared endeav-
ors that legitimately fosters special attachments to their fellow citizens and 
their state— legitimately, that is, so long as the state is on the  whole playing 
its proper role and acting justly when it defi nes and enforces duties and 
rights. For Stilz then, more explicitly than for any of our other authors, cos-
mopolitan, universal conceptions of justice are foundational. Yet like all the 
writers in this fi nal part, except for Robert Goodin, she concludes that many 
types of cosmopolitan po liti cal arrangements are probably better feared 
than loved.
If the authors in our fi rst two parts found it diffi  cult to embrace many of 
the forms of militarism and immigrant exclusion that are features of the 
current world of still- powerful, though oft en embattled and far from fully 
sovereign nation- states, the authors in Part III, writing from perspectives 
right, left , and center, leave us with many doubts about the cosmopolitan 
options that appear on off er. Th e results of their refl ections do not present us 
with consensus on how we can best proceed in confronting the challenges 
and alternatives they delineate. Yet there are common threads: the essays in 
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each section portray nation- states as increasingly accepting forms of plural 
citizenship but in ways that do not clearly lead in more cosmopolitan direc-
tions, at least not clearly desirable ones. Some powerful states are embracing 
plural citizenships as means of exercising force in further ways rather than 
limiting militarism. National ac cep tance of immigrants and plural citizen-
ships are generally means to protect and advance state interests rather than 
policies that seek to transcend those interests. And despite the lack of nor-
mative consensus, there appears to be wider interest in fi nding ways to adapt 
national sovereignty than there is support for any clear alternative to a West-
phalian world.
Some readers may, however, reach diff erent conclusions. We trust that 
in any case, all who read these essays will gain a richer understanding of the 
issues of po liti cal sovereignty and citizenship that are emerging today. Th is 
enhanced understanding may prove a valuable resource at a time when, for 
better and for worse, a world that once seemed familiar is giving way to a 
world that we are in many ways invited to make anew.
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